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Neighborhood Accountability Boards: The Strength of 
Weak Practices and Prospects for a ―Community 
Building‖ Restorative Model 
Mara Schiff, Ph.D.  
Gordon Bazemore, Ph.D.  
Martha Brown, M.Ed.  
ABSTRACT 
In the mid-1990s, restorative justice practices became known to a 
number of criminal and juvenile justice practitioners and justice 
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reform advocates. While the excitement about ―conferencing‖ models 
from New Zealand and Australia brought international attention to 
restorative justice, long-standing and ―new‖ North American 
practices—including Victim-Offender Mediation (―VOM‖), 
Peacemaking Circles (―Circles‖), and other models-gained both 
popularity and expanded application. This Article addresses 
Neighborhood Accountability Boards (―NABs‖), one such popular 
restorative decision-making model. Although criticized by some 
restorative justice advocates, we argue that NABs may fill a niche as 
a neighborhood level ―community building‖ response to lower or 
mid-range crimes that is capable of serving a larger and more 
diverse population of offenders, victims, and their families than other 
restorative models. Based on an underlying theory of pro-social 
connection through reliance on ―weak ties,‖ we argue that NABs 
may provide broader instrumental social support for offenders and 
victims from community members and families. Moreover, by offering 
local social, community, and family support, NABs may help 
ameliorate the conditions that foster crime and conflict management 
at the neighborhood level.  
INTRODUCTION 
Although Victim-Offender Mediation (―VOM‖) became a sound 
and very popular option in some parts of the United States by the 
1980s, it was not until national experiments with Family Group 
Conferencing (―FGC‖) in Australia and New Zealand that restorative 
justice gained almost worldwide attention. In addition, John 
Braithwaite’s concomitant development of reintegrative shaming 
theory was consistent with the goals of most of these restorative 
practices, bringing international academic interest to restorative 
justice.
1
 In the United States, NABs also took root as another popular 
restorative model.
2
 This Article addresses the role of NABs as a 
 
 1. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); John 
Braithwaite & Stephen Mugford, Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies: Dealing 
with Juvenile Offenders, BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY, Spring 1994, at 139. 
 2. Gordon Bazemore & Curt Taylor Griffiths, Conferences, Circles, Boards, and 
Mediations: The ―New Wave‖ of Community Justice Decisionmaking, FED. PROBATION, July 
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highly localized restorative decision-making model for juvenile and 
criminal justice reform that seeks to engage victims, offenders, 
families, other citizens, and community groups as resources in an 
effective response to crime.
3
  
Sometimes known by such terms as youth panels, reparative 
boards, or community accountability boards (among others), the 
concept underlying NABs in the United States can be traced back to 
New Jersey’s Youth Aide Panels that began operating as early as the 
1930s.
4
 While these early examples of community involvement with 
troubled youth were not likely informed by a restorative approach, 
they did seek to provide courts with an alternative that would 
encourage community support for ―at risk‖ youth. Scotland’s more 
modern use of ―youth panels‖ provides a current example of a Board 
model that indeed became viewed as a restorative justice effort in the 
1990s.
5
  
The first restorative panels in the United States originated in 1994 
in Great Falls, Montana and Boise, Idaho, followed shortly thereafter 
by panels in the counties of San Bernardino and Sacramento, 
California.
6
 In the early 1990s, Vermont also began laying the 
groundwork for what was likely the first statewide use of panels for 
adult offenders—a probation-based model known as ―reparative 
boards‖ designed to serve as an alternative to jail or short-term prison 
sentences.
7
 Vermont’s juvenile justice authority instituted a youth-
focused ―reparative panel‖ program for juvenile offenders in 2000.  
Today, NABs are viewed by many practitioners as one of four 
structurally different restorative decision-making models. While there 
 
1997, at 25, 31. 
 3. Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing 
Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 1, 3–5. 
 4. H. TED RUBIN, Diversion to the Community: Neighborhood Accountability Boards in 
Santa Clara County, California, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PROGRAMS 
20-1, 20-1 to 20-10 (2003).  
 5. See RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: CONFERENCES, MEDIATION AND CIRCLES 
(Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell eds., 2001); Niall Kearney et al., Restorative Justice in 
Scotland: An Overview, 4 BRIT. J. COMMUNITY JUST. 55 (2006). 
 6. MARCUS NIETO, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, PROBATION FOR ADULT AND COMMUNITY 
OFFENDERS: OPTIONS FOR IMPROVED ACCOUNTABILITY 6 (1998). 
 7. David R. Karp & Lynne Walther, Community Reparative Boards in Vermont: Theory 
and Practice, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING 
COMMUNITIES (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001). 
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are many ―within-model‖ variations and multiple names for most 
restorative conferencing practices, the four prominent distinctive 
models are: VOM, FGC, Circles, and NABs.
8
 Each model has gained 
recognition as a decision-making alternative to the more traditional, 
primarily punitive criminal justice system employed in the United 
States and abroad.
9
  
Despite some disagreement concerning the degree to which NABs 
constitute a ―true‖ restorative practice,10 they have arguably found a 
place along the continuum of non-adversarial restorative decision-
making practices. Specifically, NABs fill a space that relies heavily 
on community volunteers and is both less formal than court processes 
and less intense than either FGCs or Circles. It can also be said that 
the relative ―restorativeness‖ of NABs (as in other practices) cannot 
necessarily be assumed because of title alone, and is thus best 
assessed by examining specific practices in individual programs.
11
 
Notwithstanding the growth and continuing presence of NABs in 
more than a dozen states and numerous municipalities,
12
 studies of 
these programs are more limited in number than research on FGCs 
and VOM, though a number of recent rigorous studies indicate NABs 
have a positive impact.
13 
The most valid criticism of NABs has been their limited success 
in engaging and placing priority on crime victims’ participation. 
 
 8. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 3 (discussing and comparing the four models). 
 9. Id. at 1. 
 10. See Paul McCold, Paradigm Muddle: A Response to the Responses, CONTEMP. JUST. 
REV., Mar. 2004, at 143, 143 (arguing that restorative justice should be distinguished from 
community justice, instead of being characterized as ―restorative community justice‖). 
 11. GORDON BAZEMORE & MARA SCHIFF, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM AND RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE: BUILDING THEORY AND POLICY FROM PRACTICE 155, 327 (2004). 
 12. See, e.g., NIETO, supra note 6; Nancy Rodriguez, Restorative Justice, Communities, 
and Delinquency: Whom do we Reintegrate?, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2005). 
 13. See generally EDMUND MCGARRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE & DELIQUENCY PREVENTION, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CONFERENCES AS AN EARLY 
RESPONSE TO YOUNG OFFENDERS (2001). While this study refers to the model assessed as 
FGC, in point of fact, the practice actually more resembles a NAB more than an FGC. For this 
reason, we have included it as a reference for NAB evaluation. See generally David R. Karp, 
Gordon Bazemore & J.D. Chesire, The Role and Attitudes of Restorative Board Members: A 
Case Study of Volunteers in Community Justice, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 487 (2004) (reporting 
findings from a survey of volunteers serving on Vermont Reparative Probation Boards); 
Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 117; James Bonta et al., Exploring the Black Box of Community 
Supervision, 47 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 248, 251–52 (2008). 
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Though not limited to NABs, this problem is partially related to the 
structure of these programs, their inability or disinterest in engaging 
victims, and possibly to a lack of victim interest in participation 
because of most NAB cases’ relative lack of seriousness.14 This state 
of affairs is not necessarily characteristic of all NABs, however, and 
some practitioners have demonstrated that NABs are capable of 
improving victim involvement when leaders and supporters prioritize 
and find resources (such as assigning staff) for this purpose.
15
 Indeed, 
some NABs or related models boast relatively high rates of victim 
participation
16
 and may, by responding to issues of local crime and 
deviance, be helping to set normative standards of community 
behavior.
17
 
In this Article, we argue that the strength of the NAB model may 
lie not in its adherence to strict standards of a ―pure‖ restorative 
process, but rather in its ability to serve other equally important 
community-building and social justice goals by fostering and 
building stronger local relationships. In this regard, one avenue for 
consideration in the still-evolving role of NABs can be seen in what 
might be termed ―micro-communities.‖ For example, faith 
communities and neighborhood associations may indeed build on 
what have been referred to as ―parochial controls‖ in order to manage 
conflict and promote collective efficacy.
18
 These controls operate as a 
mid-level intervention between formal governmental controls and 
―private controls‖ exercised by family members. 
In this Article, we first review the literature on NABs and explore 
their various applications in the United States and abroad. We then 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of the model and consider the 
potential capacity of NABs to facilitate community building and 
promote normative standards of conflict resolution and social 
 
 14. BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 207–08. 
 15. Id. at 197–98. 
 16. See MCGARRELL, supra note 13, at 6. 
 17. See BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 77–80 (discussing norm affirmation and 
values clarification as one of the dimensions of community-building). 
 18. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL 
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 78 (2000); Francis T. Cullen, Social Support as an Organizing 
Concept for Criminology: Residential Address to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 11 
JUST. Q. 527, 537 (1994). 
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support. NABs should not be seen as replacing or dominating other 
restorative models that may offer a more intentional focus on victim-
offender needs or more assertive attention on underlying causes of 
behavior, however. Instead, we suggest that NABs, because of their 
neighborhood base, may be more capable of achieving capacity-
building objectives than other restorative practices. Indeed, from 
another perspective, NABs may benefit from a community base that 
more easily responds to victim and offender needs within a localized 
neighborhood context. By contrast, other models are often centrally 
located within either court or justice centers that are less sensitive to 
the context in which crimes may occur.  
Finally, we discuss important theoretical variations in models of 
changes associated with the type of support offered to offenders, 
victims, families, and communities. Specifically, we argue that the 
difference between the social support component of NABs and other 
restorative practices is the NABs’ primary reliance on what 
sociologists have referred to as ―strong vs. weak ties.‖19 ―Strong ties‖ 
are those associated with families, extended families, and organic 
communities which rely heavily on expressive, often emotive, social 
control and support.
20
 ―Weak ties,‖ on the other hand, are based on 
more casual relationships and encounters, which in modernity are 
nonetheless the kind of connections needed to find a job, gain access 
to higher education, and call on advocates for support in times of 
trouble (e.g., arrest, trouble in school, etc.).
21
  
Ultimately, we suggest that NAB models reflect a choice between 
two practice extremes. The first choice amounts to what is essentially 
an informal ―weak court,‖ with little impact and authority and 
wherein citizens essentially act as ―juries‖ in very minor cases (not 
unlike many Teen Courts). The second, however, is a viable 
community-based practice capable of bringing citizens together in 
support of problem-solving crime prevention and intervention at the 
neighborhood level that could successfully process a wide range of 
 
 19. See generally Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 
(1973); Rose Laub Coser, The Complexity of Roles as Seedbed of Individual Autonomy, in THE 
IDEA OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE: PAPERS IN HONOR OF ROBERT K. MERTON 237, 242–43 (Lewis 
A. Coser ed., 1975). 
 20. See Granovetter, supra note 19, at 1361. 
 21. See id.  
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cases—both independently and in support of partnerships with 
criminal justice agencies.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most important in the consideration of restorative justice models 
is a general commitment to basic values about the response to crime. 
In addition to challenging dominant retributive justice strategies, 
these models also embrace a different, more robust form of 
accountability that lays the groundwork for a different model of 
criminal justice. Restorative models call for and incentivize a new 
design that begins with engaging communities in localized justice 
processes grounded in both parochial and private controls.
22
 By 
enabling offenders to make community reparation in conjunction 
with compassionate and localized social support,
23
 these approaches 
challenge the retributive punishment and traditional treatment models 
that typically operate in isolation from community input.  
Principles of Restorative Justice  
Restorative Justice practices are grounded in three core principles: 
(1) justice requires that responses to crime repair harm to persons 
hurt or injured by the criminal act; (2) all stakeholders should be 
included in the response to crime as early and often as possible; and 
(3) partnerships between government and community are central to a 
comprehensive justice response that seeks to expand the role of 
community involvement.
24
 As an overarching philosophy of 
addressing victim and community needs in the aftermath of conflict 
and harm, restorative justice is more than a program model. Rather, 
restorative practices share a common distinguishing characteristic: 
offender(s), victim(s) or a victim representative, a facilitator, and 
 
 22. See Albert Hunter, Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of 
Crime and Incivility in Urban Communities, in THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL CONTROL: 
CITIZENSHIP AND INSTITUTION BUILDING IN MODERN SOCIETY 230, 240 (Gerald D. Suttles & 
Mayer N. Zald eds., 1985). 
 23. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 549. 
 24. See DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE 43–48 
(3d ed. 2002); BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 27–30.  
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other family and community members sit face-to-face in an informal 
meeting (a non-adversarial process) to consider a crime’s impact or 
harm done to both victims and the community.
25
 To repair this harm, 
participants then develop a plan that meets the needs of those most 
affected by the crime.
26
 The dialogue process is not intended to 
establish guilt or innocence, assign blame, or impose punishment, and 
the participants do not rely on formal legal procedures or attorneys to 
reach decisions.
27
 What makes the specific encounter and the process 
itself ―restorative‖ is ―the extent to which the process adheres to a set 
of core principles and a focus on the overall goal of repairing the 
harm crime causes.‖28  
Bazemore and Schiff distinguish four broad programmatic 
variations which, over the last several decades, have seemed the most 
structurally and procedurally stable.
29
 These models include victim-
offender mediation/dialogue (―VOM/D‖); FGC; Boards; and 
Circles.
30
 Variation between the four approaches differs primarily 
based upon who attends and participates in the conference, who 
facilitates the dialogue and how the process is guided, what structure 
is employed for ongoing management of program operations beyond 
each individual encounter, and what dominant philosophy guides the 
process.
31
  
The United States Board Experience 
As of 2001, there were approximately 230 individual youth NABs 
in the United States.
32
 In recent years, states with active NABs 
include Arizona, California, Kansas, Florida, Missouri, Oregon, 
Texas, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont.
33
 The most 
 
 25. BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 36. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.; see also VAN NESS & STRONG, supra note 24, at 49–50; Russ Immarigeon, 
Restorative Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Crime Victims: A Review of the Literature, in 
RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 305, 307–08 
(Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999). 
 29. BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 37. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at 101. 
 33. See id. at 106–07; Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 108; Albert W. Dzur, Civic 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Neighborhood Accountability Boards 25 
 
 
well-known example of NABs in the United States were established 
in Vermont after citizens expressed the belief that they could handle 
non-violent offenders in the community better than the criminal 
justice system.
34
  
Vermont’s reparative boards, like most NABs, are generally 
composed of small groups of trained citizen volunteers who conduct 
public, face-to-face meetings with adult offenders convicted of minor 
nonviolent offenses and who have been court-ordered to participate 
in the process.
35
 As of 2003, sixty-seven reparative boards with 
approximately four hundred volunteers had handled 7742 cases in 
Vermont.
36
 In this process, volunteers: (1) meet with offenders to 
develop sanctioning agreements; (2) monitor offenders; and (3) 
submit periodic compliance reports to the court.
37
 Most adult non-
violent felons and misdemeanants sentenced by NABs are required to 
make restitution to victims, perform complete community service, or 
both. Finally, while members have relatively wide discretion in the 
deliberation process, they are encouraged to follow certain general 
guidelines: 
―(1) Victims (if present) [have the opportunity to] describe the 
impact of the offenders’ behavior; 
(2) Offenders [agree to] make amends to victims[, other] 
affected parties[, and their communities; 
(3)] Offenders demonstrate healthy behaviors and learn ways 
to avoid reoffending; 
[(4)] The community [assists with the] reintegration 
[process].‖38 
 
Implications of Restorative Justice Theory: Citizen Participation and Criminal Justice Policy, 
36 POL’Y SCI. 279, 280–81 (2003). 
 34. See JOHN DOBLE & JUDITH GREENE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, ATTITUDES TOWARD 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN VERMONT: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT AN EXPERIMENT WITH 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 2, 22 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
182361.pdf. 
 35. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 3, at 3. 
 36. Dzur, supra note 33, at 298.  
 37. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 3, at 4. 
 38. Dzur, supra note 33, at 299. 
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As early as 1997, and only two years following the program’s 
inception, data indicated that 82 percent of participating Vermont 
offenders completed their community sentences without further 
court-involvement.
39
 In addition, the program resulted in a 3 percent 
decrease in recidivism compared to those offenders who received 
traditional probation.
40
 The Vermont Department of Corrections 
(―VDOC‖) also implemented a program for juvenile offenders in 
1999.
41
 Despite initial concerns about punitive intent expressed in 
some NABs, an independent survey of NABs members indicated 
overwhelming support for reintegration and rehabilitation rather than 
punishment.
42
  
Several states followed, or simultaneously implemented variations 
on, the Vermont model. For instance, the Maricopa County Arizona 
Juvenile Probation Department created Community Justice 
Committees in 1995 to deal with their increasing juvenile crime 
rate.
43
 Similarly, in Oregon, Community Justice Centers and 
Merchant Accountability Boards addressed youthful theft and 
shoplifting.
44
 California has also successfully operated NAB 
programs for non-violent, generally first-time juvenile offenders in 
San Bernardino, Santa Clara, San Jose, and Sacramento counties 
since the mid-1990s.
45
 In the Midwest, Missouri has also 
experimented with neighborhood boards and other forms of 
conferencing.
46
 In 2000, Salt Lake City implemented its ―Passages‖ 
program which, though not an official NAB, has all the elements of a 
restorative board process.
47
 In 2003, the Florida Department of 
Juvenile Justice (FDJJ) funded and implemented thirty-three NABs 
 
 39. Mark Hansen, Repairing the Damage: Citizen Boards Tailor Sentences to Fit the 
Crimes in Vermont, 83 A.B.A. J. 20, 20 (1997). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Dzur, supra note 33, at 298; Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 3, at 3 n.5. 
 42. See Karp, Bazemore & Chesire, supra note 13, at 498–501, 503.  
 43. Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 108.  
 44. Dennis Mahoney & Deevy Holcomb, In Pursuit of Community Justice, 33 YOUTH & 
SOC’Y 296, 306–08 (2001). 
 45. See NIETO, supra note 6, at 6; BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11. 
 46. STATE OF MO. FAMILY COURT-JUVENILE DIV., NEIGHBORHOOD ACCOUNTABILITY 
BOARDS (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/hosted/circuit22/Juvenile/2011% 
20Juv%20docs/Neighborhood%20Accountability%20Board.pdf. 
 47. Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Revisiting Informal Justice: Restorative Justice 
and Democratic Professionalism, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 139, 153 (2004). 
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for first-time juvenile offenders in thirteen counties throughout the 
state; in 2005 the FDJJ reported sponsoring seventeen NABs in 
fifteen judicial circuits in a variety of government, not-for-profit, 
school, and faith-based agencies (though only a few of these 
currently remain active, largely due to cuts in the FDDJ budget).
48
 
Finally, one of the largest and most long-standing programs, 
originally known as the ―Community Panels for Youth,‖ has served 
much of the Chicago area for over a decade, based on a model 
program begun with law students in a clinic at Northwestern 
University.
49
  
U.S. School Accountability Boards 
Restorative practices are becoming progressively more common 
in a variety of criminal and non-criminal justice settings. For 
example, School Accountability Boards (―SABs‖) are an increasingly 
common restorative response to school disciplinary issues. Schools 
around the United States, as well as internationally, have been 
experimenting with restorative practices to deal with disciplinary 
problems in school rather than suspending and expelling ―problem‖ 
children who later end up under juvenile justice jurisdiction.
50
 SABs 
are becoming a popular school-based restorative model wherein peer 
groups of students, faculty, staff, and sometimes external community 
members, consider and respond to a youth’s challenges in an 
inclusive and relationship-driven community. School-based 
restorative practices have been implemented in Florida, Illinois, 
 
 48. FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, NEIGHBORHOOD ACCOUNTABILITY BOARDS: A 
GUIDE TO LEARN MORE ABOUT NEIGHBORHOOD ACCOUNTABILITY BDS. 8 (2003), available at 
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/Prevention/nab/NAB_GuideBook.pdf; Department of Juvenile Justice, 
2005–2006 Neighborhood Accountability Board List, DJJ, http://www.djj.state.fl.us/Prevention/ 
documents/NAB_Providers.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). 
 49. Community Justice for Youth Institute, About Us, http://cjyi.org/about-us (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2011).  
 50. See FLORIDA STATE CONFERENCE NAACP, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & NAACP 
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND: ADDRESSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CRISIS IN 
FLORIDA 10–12 (2006), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/full 
%20report.pdf; Ronnie Casella, Zero Tolerance Policy in Schools: Rationale, Consequences, 
and Alternatives, 105 TCHRS. C. REC. 872, 885 (2003); Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Gordon 
Bazemore & Nancy Riestenberg, Beyond Zero Tolerance: Restoring Justice in Secondary 
Schools, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUVENILE JUST. 123, 124–25 (2006). 
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Colorado, California, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Arizona, 
Michigan, and Minnesota, with SABs standing as the model of choice 
in several of these states.
51
 Although there has been relatively little 
rigorous impact evaluation, formative research suggests generally 
positive results from restorative practices in schools.
52
  
At the post-secondary level, Skidmore College in New York 
incorporated restorative justice measures into its internal integrity 
boards, which are comprised of ―four students, one staff member, and 
one or two faculty members.
53
 In this model, a group of board 
members who receive extensive training in restorative practices 
represent a cross-section of the local university population who hold 
students accountable for honor code violations and other minor 
offenses.
54
  
The International Landscape of Boards 
Outside of the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom 
have the most experience with the board model. Unlike the United 
States, both Canada and the United Kingdom have created national 
oversight structures designed to address juvenile crime and which are 
charged with implementing and managing restorative initiatives in 
multiple jurisdictions. Canada’s passage of the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act (―YCJA‖) in 2003 led to the establishment of Youth 
Justice Committees that use citizen volunteers trained in restorative 
practices to help manage minor cases.
55
 In the United Kingdom, 
 
 51. See David Karp & Beau Breslin, Restorative Justice in School Communities, 33 Youth 
Soc’y 249 (2001); Stinchcomb, Bazemore & Riestenberg, supra note 50, at 132; Nancy 
Riestenberg, The Restorative Recovery School: Countering Chemical Dependency, 16 
RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 21 (2007). 
 52. See Gordon Bazemore, Sandra O’Brien & Mark Carey, The Synergy and Substance of 
Organizational and Community Change in the Response to Crime and Conflict: The Emergence 
and Potential of Restorative Justice, 5 PUB. ORG. REV. 287, 305 (2005); Riestenberg, supra 
note 51, at 22; Stinchcomb, Bazemore & Riestenberg, supra note 50, at 132–33. 
 53. David Karp & Susanne Conrad, Restorative Justice and College Student Misconduct, 
5 PUB. ORG. REV. 315, 321–22 (2005). 
 54. Id. at 322. 
 55. Doug Hillian, Marge Reitsma-Street & Jim Hackler, Conferencing in the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act of Canada: Policy Developments in British Columbia, 46 CAN. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 343, 345, 349 (2004). 
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boards have been implemented as Youth Offender Panels to deal with 
juvenile offenders accused of both minor and more serious offenses.
56
  
In Canada, approximately sixty to seventy community 
accountability programs (convened by either the police or the Crown) 
are available as an alternative to court decisionmaking or sentencing 
for relatively minor offenses.
57
 Youth Justice Committees made up of 
citizen advisors to the Youth Court generally host community 
accountability programs and other restorative practices such as FGCs, 
VOMs, or Circles in all provinces except British Columbia.
58
 The 
breadth, scope and ―restorativeness‖ of these programs varies widely 
from province to province, however.
59
 
Unlike the Youth Justice Committees in Canada, the Youth 
Offender Panels in England and Wales deal with more than just 
minor crimes. Overseen by the Youth Justice Board established in 
1998, these panels are available throughout the United Kingdom in 
both ―quaint and not-so-quaint settings‖60 and are the primary 
sentencing mechanism for youth aged ten to seventeen.
61
 Under this 
system, local Youth Offending Teams (―YOTs‖) are overseen by 
local Youth Offending Services, and are comprised of representatives 
from the police, probation, social services, health, education, drugs 
and alcohol misuse, and housing officers who coordinate cases for 
each young offender.
62
 After receiving a Referral Order from the 
court, the youth is brought before a Panel consisting of at least two 
community members, including a chair who leads the discussion and 
 
 56. See Theo Gavrielidés, Restorative Justice: Are We There Yet?: Responding to the 
Home Office’s Consultation Questions, 14 CRIM. L.F. 385, 386–87 (2003) (finding that over 
27,000 juvenile offenders go through these panels annually); Adam Crawford, Involving Lay 
People in Criminal Justice, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 693, 694 (2004). 
 57. Hillian, Reitsma-Street & Hackler, supra note 55, at 348–49. 
 58. Id. at 349.  
 59. Brenda Morrison & Colleen Pawlychka, Juvenile Justice and Restorative Justice: 
Reflecting on Developments in British Columbia, in YOUTH AT RISK AND YOUTH JUSTICE: A 
CANADIAN OVERVIEW (John A. Winterdyk & Russell Smandych eds., forthcoming Apr. 2012).  
 60. See Crawford, supra note 56, at 694. 
 61. ADAM CRAWFORD & TIM NEWBURN, YOUTH OFFENDING AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: 
IMPLEMENTING REFORM IN YOUTH JUSTICE 11, 59 (2003). 
 62. Youth Offending Teams, YOUTH JUST. BOARD, http://www.yjb.gov.uk/en-gb/yjs/ 
youthoffundingteams/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
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a representative from the YOT.
63
 Unfortunately, victims are very 
rarely present.
64
 
Research on Boards 
There is limited research available on the impact of neighborhood 
boards. The most comprehensive research to date has been conducted 
on Vermont’s Reparative Boards,65 Maricopa County, Arizona’s 
Boards
66
 and the Youth Offender Panels.
67
 These studies found a mix 
of generally positive outcomes regarding volunteer and victim 
involvement, offender sanctions, and community engagement, albeit 
with some concerns about the strength of certain restorative justice 
components in some programs, such as volunteer 
―representativeness‖ and community engagement.68  
Very early research from California suggested that the 
combination of mobilizing an effective, localized volunteer base and 
decreasing recidivism rates encouraged expanded development of 
NAB programs, and some estimates reported savings to the State, in 
two counties alone, of up to $12 million.
69
 Rodriguez suggests that 
recidivism in Maricopa County, Arizona, may be lower among 
youths processed through NABs than among comparable youths in 
―other diversion programs‖ in the twenty-four months following 
successful completion of the NAB diversion program. Moreover, 
completion of reparative agreements, restitution, and community 
service was also higher among NAB-processed youth.
70
  
While there has been no comprehensive evaluation of the Florida 
NABs, anecdotal evidence from one county
71
 suggests a 96.8 percent 
success rate for NAB youth compared with 13 percent for 
 
 63. CRAWFORD & NEWBURN, supra note 61, at 60. 
 64. Id. at 127 (acknowledging a distinct lack of victim presence at most panel meetings). 
 65. See David Karp, Harm and Repair: Observing Restorative Justice in Vermont, 18 
JUST. Q. 727 (2001). 
 66. See Rodriguez, supra note 12 (analyzing the effect of Maricopa County’s restorative 
justice program on recidivism).  
 67. See CRAWFORD & NEWBURN, supra note 61. 
 68. Karp, Bazemore & Chesire, supra note 13, at 488. 
 69. NIETO, supra note 6, at 15.  
 70. Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 111, 117–19. 
 71. LEE CNTY. HUMAN SERVS., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT (2010).  
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traditionally-processed youth, due in part to a recidivism rate as low 
as 3.2 percent (vs. 87 percent for non-NAB youth) and a cost savings 
of $1,470 per NAB-processed youth.
72
 Although not technically a 
NAB, Indianapolis’s juvenile program operates similarly; based on a 
long-term random assignment study, it continues to demonstrate 
success when compared with other diversion programs.
73
  
Some research on the United Kingdom’s Youth Offending Teams 
(YOTs) reports significant challenges, including insufficient funding, 
inefficient service delivery, ineffective recruitment and retention of 
staff, growing caseloads, and a low satisfaction rate (48 percent) 
among juvenile clients.
74
 Canadian accountability programs have 
been similarly criticized due to their location in government 
organizations, which effectively limits community engagement and 
authoritative policymaking in areas such as appropriate case 
severity.
75
  
WEAKNESSES OF THE NAB MODEL 
While the limited empirical evidence available suggests that 
NABs are a viable and useful intervention model, conceptual and 
practical challenges arise from limited victim participation; 
community exclusivity; and (at times) narrow, routinized, and 
unimaginative informal sentencing approaches. Moreover, 
inconsistent and inadequate volunteer training, as well as insufficient 
volunteer recruitment and retention, have been cited as challenges to 
the restorative impact of NABs.
76
 In the following paragraphs, we 
consider both the surface and subtle implications of each of these 
concerns. 
 
 72. See FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 48.  
 73. MCGARRELL, supra note 13, at 3, 9. 
 74. Christina Stahlkopf, Political, Structural, and Cultural Influences on England’s Youth 
Offending Team Practices, 18 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 455, 462–65 (2008); Chris Fox, 
Inspection of Youth Offending Teams 2003–2008, 56 PROBATION J. 286 (2009). 
 75. Hillian, Reitsma-Street & Hackler, supra note 55, at 349, 353, 359–62. 
 76. See BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 110; McCold, supra note 10, at 21; 
CRAWFORD & NEWBURN, supra note 61, at 184–215.  
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Victim Participation  
The most prevalent criticism about NABs as a restorative practice 
is perhaps the inconsistent inclusion of victims in the decision-
making process.
77
 Victims, the argument goes, are both central and 
essential to true restorative practice, so their exclusion, whether 
intentional or circumstantial, limits the degree to which the process 
can truly be considered restorative.
78
 Without active victim 
participation, the practice may become yet another punitive, 
deterrent, rehabilitative, or reintegrative offender-focused 
intervention designed exclusively for and about offenders and their 
needs. 
Karp and Drakulich found that as many as 90 percent of victims 
failed to participate in the reparative board process.
79
 Some were 
inadequately contacted by the VDOC and some were not interested in 
participating.
80
 However, among those who did participate, the vast 
majority were satisfied with the process and the outcome of the 
case.
81
 Crawford contends that victim inclusion is hampered by two 
factors: the manner in which concern for youthful offenders
82
 
dominates the process and, likewise, the fact that ―[p]resenting 
victims with real choices over attendance, input, and participation 
requires adaptations of cultural assumptions and working practices‖ 
that are not designed with victims in mind.
83
  
The challenges presented by incorporating the needs, interests, 
and participation of victims is exacerbated by cultural and systemic 
expectations that do not include victims as key stakeholders in any 
justice process, either in the United States or abroad. An examination 
 
 77. Bazemore & Griffiths, supra note 2, at 34; Crawford, supra note 56, at 695–96; 
Kathleen Daly, Justice in Many Rooms, 3 CRIM. PUB. POL’Y 651, 652 (2004); David Karp & 
Kevin Drakulich, Minor Crime in a Quaint Setting: Practices, Outcomes, and Limits of 
Vermont Reparative Probation Boards, 3 CRIM. PUB. POL’Y 655 (2004); BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, 
supra note 11, at 206–09; Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 103; CRAWFORD & NEWBURN, supra 
note 61, at 213.  
 78. HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 184 (3d 
ed. 2005); McCold, supra note 10, at 15.  
 79. Karp & Drakulich, supra note 77, at 666–67.  
 80. Id. at 666. 
 81. Id. at 667. 
 82. Crawford, supra note 56, at 695.  
 83. Id. (emphasis added). 
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of Youth Offender Panels in the United Kingdom revealed that 
roughly 30 percent of identifiable victims were never notified about 
panel meetings.
84
 A significant number of victims who were notified 
felt that their involvement and participation in the panel meeting was 
limited, and 70 percent of victims who left the meeting early reported 
not receiving any information about the content of the eventual 
contract.
85
 
The NAB model has among the lowest victim participation rates 
of all restorative approaches. Victims’ advocates suggest that this is a 
fundamental flaw among all restorative practices and that as long as 
victims remain a peripheral part of an offender-oriented, adversarial, 
and retributive justice system, they will never be fully and adequately 
recognized as critical participants in the justice process.
86
 
Exclusivity: Identifying, Defining and Understanding  
the Role of the ―Community‖ 
A variety of conceptual issues surround both intentions and 
experiences of NAB community involvement, and both the 
boundaries and definition of ―community‖ are ambiguous. 
Braithwaite and Mugford and others contend that the appropriate 
definition of community in restorative processes is the ―community 
of care,‖ or those persons who define themselves as having been 
directly or indirectly affected by the event.
87
 With NABs, however, 
community is also a geographical consideration—that is, members of 
the local neighborhood tend to be the designated community 
representatives. Nonetheless, there is no apparent reason why NABs 
could not incorporate both the community of care and the broader 
community of place. Indeed, there are examples of neighborhood 
programs offering a wide range of conferencing options incorporating 
a broad approach to community representation as well as establishing 
a strong neighborhood-centered volunteer base. As suggested earlier, 
 
 84. CRAWFORD & NEWBURN, supra note 61, at 185. 
 85. Id. at 205.  
 86. SUSAN HERMAN, PARALLEL JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 51 (2010). 
 87. See generally Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 1.  
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such programs build on parochial controls while also tapping into and 
supporting the private controls of families.  
Crawford claims that community involvement is crucial to 
empowering offender behavioral change, and that localized practices 
which are fostered, administered and ―owned‖ by volunteers enable a 
more dynamic and inclusive dialogue in response to youth crime.
88
 
Others contend that ―community‖ representation on NABs is 
exclusive and non-representative, and therefore neither ―includes‖ 
nor involves the young offenders being sanctioned. Some United 
Kingdom Youth Panels seem to have done well at reflecting 
community membership,
89
 while others have been less successful at 
engaging a representative cross-section of community members.
90
 In 
relatively ethnically homogenous Vermont, NABs seem to have 
recruited a large and fairly representative group of community 
members, as have NABs in a predominantly African-American 
neighborhood in Albany, New York.
91
  
These disparate examples indicate the robustness of NABs, but 
also beg the question of why some are able to become centers of 
community support and collective efficacy while others are not. 
While Vermont’s demographics may lend itself to successful board 
practice because of its rural, homogenous, and relatively crime-free 
milieu, Boyes-Watson speculates as to whether this model is 
transferrable to urban, heterogeneous, high-crime communities that 
suffer from high rates of poverty, low education, large families, high 
unemployment, poor schools, densely populated public housing 
projects, active street gangs, open-air drug markets, prostitution, 
deteriorated housing stock, and limited capital investment.
92
 While 
such considerations have not been empirically examined, increasing 
numbers of culturally and economically diverse states such as 
Arizona, California, and Oregon continue to implement variations on 
the reparative board model.
93
 
 
 88. Crawford, supra note 56, at 695.  
 89. Id. at 697–98. 
 90. CRAWFORD & NEWBURN, supra note 61, at 77–79.  
 91. Karp & Drakulich, supra note 77, at 697; Karp, Bazemore & Chesire, supra note 13.  
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 93. See, e.g., Karp, Bazemore & Chesire, supra note 13, at 502–03 (indicating that the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Neighborhood Accountability Boards 35 
 
 
A potential challenge to community representativeness on NABs 
is that only those community members with time, willingness, and 
interest will choose to serve. That typically leaves retirees, non-
working adults without young children, and other self-selected 
groups. The degree to which such limited representation affects 
outcomes is unclear. Karp, Bazemore, and Chesire found that, unlike 
the offenders they held accountable, Vermont representatives tended 
to be older and white, with both very ―stable residence histories‖ and 
surprisingly strong educational backgrounds.
94
 Offenders, on the 
other hand, tended to be younger, poorly educated, often minority 
men.
95
 Moreover, civic-minded volunteer programs like NABs tend 
to attract representatives who may share agendas, values, and 
perspectives, which—as Karp and Walther contend—may or may not 
be consistent with those of their intended recipients. Karp and 
Walther contend that such volunteers may not truly represent the 
offenders and their respective communities, thereby limiting the 
degree to which offenders feel empowered by the process.
96
 
Moreover, as a central goal of community justice is to reintegrate 
offenders back into their communities, critics question whether older, 
middle-class adults are truly capable of understanding what it takes to 
successfully reintegrate a poor youthful offender of color into a 
community about which they know little. In order to make restoration 
meaningful, defining ―community‖ and ensuring that representative 
volunteers are included in decisionmaking is crucial to successful 
offender reparation and reintegration.
97
 
Understanding community roles requires consideration of the 
degree to which such self-selected and potentially non-representative 
community members may detract from offenders’ civil and 
constitutional rights to a fair trial, a jury of their peers, and equal 
 
―civic mindedness of [Vermont’] long-term residents[] and the time availability of retirees‖ 
explains the predominant demographic representation of board members). 
 94. Id. at 493.  
 95. Id. at 503. 
 96. David R. Karp & Lynne Walther, Community Reparative Boards in Vermont: Theory 
and Practice, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING 
COMMUNITIES 199, 214 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001). 
 97. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
359, 380 (2005). 
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treatment under the law. Moreover, the degree to which offenders 
feel coerced into either participating or agreeing to conditions set by 
the NAB remains ambiguous. While offender rights may only be 
modestly protected in traditional court processes, there are at least 
minimal provisions for their preservation, as well as recourse for 
abuses that do not exist in voluntary NAB boards.
98
 When compared 
with traditional judicial processes, Karp and Drakulich suggest that 
the voluntary nature of NAB community membership and the 
inability of pro se juvenile offenders to contest the inclusion of 
particular NAB members (as they otherwise could during jury voir 
dire) may result in less representative participants than are present on 
traditional juries.
99
  
Though evidence from empirical studies of other restorative 
processes suggests participants perceive high levels of procedural 
fairness, a distinct lack of empirical data about NABs makes it 
difficult to decipher the degree to which young offenders truly feel 
that their rights have been protected or denied by the NAB process 
(or the court, for that matter).
100
  
Punitive, Authoritarian or Limited Sanctioning Options 
In addition to the general pattern of low victim participation, 
another early critical response to NABs was the court-like, and 
allegedly punitive, atmosphere in some communities (e.g., in some 
Vermont neighborhoods). While later research on NAB member 
attitudes indicated far stronger advocacy for restorative and 
reintegrative approaches (and an almost complete absence of support 
for punitiveness),
101
 a more court-like structure has clearly survived 
in some NABs.  
Due to limited or inadequate training, NAB members become 
prey to the routinization of cases and agreements, leaving little room 
for creativity and diluting the very flexibility that characterizes the 
restorative process and is essential to repairing harm, making 
 
 98. Karp & Drakulich, supra note 77, at 678–79. 
 99. Id. at 679.  
 100. See, e.g., James R. Bonta et al., An Outcome Evaluation of a Restorative Justice 
Alternative to Incarceration, 5 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 319, 331 (2002).  
 101. Karp, Bazemore & Chesire, supra note 13, at 498, 500, 503.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Neighborhood Accountability Boards 37 
 
 
restitution, and reintegrating victims and offenders. In the United 
Kingdom, inconsistencies in the quality of facilitators and volunteers 
in restorative justice practices have generated a call for the creation 
of an accreditation process to address the training needs of 
volunteers.
102
  
Finally, there is the potential that youth and adults sanctioned 
through NABs who fail to meet their obligations may be subject to 
increased, harsher, or longer sanctions upon being called to account 
for such failure. As is common among traditionally-sentenced 
offenders who violate conditions of probation, failing to satisfy 
conditions set by the NAB may result in additional sanctions 
imposed, or possibly even jail time as an expression of the court’s 
dissatisfaction with the offender’s efforts. While this may not differ 
from traditional processes, it seems important that a restorative 
process not fall prey to the same punitive recourse inflicted by the 
court. 
Community Volunteer Engagement and Training 
A particularly powerful aspect of NABs is their reliance on 
volunteer panel members who are seen by both victims and offenders 
as people who care and are genuinely invested in the process, as 
opposed to people who, like their judicial counterparts are 
compensated for their participation in the process.
103
  
Identifying and recruiting a diverse and qualified pool of 
volunteers and then providing them with adequate training and 
support remains challenging for NABs in light of the considerable 
inconsistency among NAB volunteers’ training, backgrounds, and 
experiences.
104
 NABs require a specialized pool of volunteers who 
are expected to perform a difficult task requiring both a basic 
understanding of the criminal justice system and an intimate 
knowledge of services and needs within the community. In addition, 
Boards may ―require a significant and ongoing time commitment.‖105  
 
 102. Gavrielidés, supra note 56, at 416.  
 103. Karp, Bazemore & Chesire, supra note 13, at 505–06.  
 104. Hansen, supra note 39, at 20; Karp & Drakulich, supra note 77, at 660–61; Boyes-
Watson, supra note 92, at 689. 
 105. Lanni, supra note 97, at 381–82. 
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These requirements may deter ordinary citizens from 
volunteering and attract only activists and the fortunate few 
with spare time for extensive volunteer activity. For example, 
when the Salt Lake reparative board program was created, 
there was such a poor volunteer response that the initial board 
members were chosen largely through personal contacts of the 
prosecutor. Susan Olson and Albert Dzur have pointed out that 
in recent years an additional problem has surfaced in the 
Vermont reparative board program. Citizen board members 
have begun to manifest signs of professionalization by holding 
annual conferences, setting up e-mail networks, and requesting 
recognition as paid officers. Rather than providing a 
mechanism for popular participation in the criminal justice 
process, there is a danger that . . . reparative board programs 
will result in transferring sanctioning power to 
unrepresentative, unelected individuals, effectively creating 
―mini-judges‖ who have no specialized training or educational 
background for the job.
106
 
STRENGTHS OF THE NAB MODEL 
Despite their drawbacks, NABs also include a variety of benefits 
often missed by restorative justice ―purists.‖107 Advocates suggest 
that NABs may accomplish a variety of other objectives not 
addressed by other restorative models: increased accountability for 
offenders who might otherwise receive neither services nor sanctions, 
cost savings (compared to traditional court processing), potentially 
better case management than that offered by overwhelmed and 
overburdened probation officers, and offender reintegration through 
community involvement and perhaps some form of civic 
engagement.
108
 We focus here on several positive aspects of NABs 
often overlooked by restorative justice theorists, including the benefit 
of a localized response to crime and harm; the capacity of NABs to 
engage a large and dedicated cadre of volunteers who may ultimately 
 
 106. Id. at 382. 
 107. McCold, supra note 10, at 143. 
 108. NIETO, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
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raise local collective efficacy at problem solving and government 
mobilization; and the possibility that ―less is more‖ when considering 
the appropriate amount of intervention to respond to relatively minor 
crimes and offenders. 
Community Collective Efficacy 
The neighborhood location of NABs places victim and offender 
within the community, thus contextualizing the impact of crime. This 
localized and relatively immediate response to crime may serve to 
build a local capacity for general problem-solving, as well as an 
increased guardianship and mentoring of neighborhood youth. 
Restorative programs located within the court or other judicial 
entities, on the other hand, may struggle to engage key stakeholders 
and effectively address victim, offender, and supporter concerns (as 
well as the harm itself) without this important neighborhood locus. 
Alternatively, the local NAB may have greater success at engaging 
the community and empowering citizens to understand, manage, and 
redefine the nature of their crime and justice problems, as well as the 
role of the government systems dedicated to serving them. Moreover, 
the best NABs have access to a standing cadre of volunteers who 
bring a range of perspectives and resources to address the harm or 
conflict, and can take some action even when victim or offender do 
not appear at the conference.
109
  
Healthy neighborhoods that successfully self-govern often have 
well-developed and varied mechanisms for neighborhood decision-
making and action, long traditions of political activism and local 
organizing, and have attracted support for several community-
building initiatives funded by government and private foundations.
110
 
On the contrary, neighborhoods affected by high crime and 
incarceration rates are likely to be disparate, transient, and 
disconnected residential urban enclaves in which residents do not feel 
any natural sense of connectedness.
111
 Of course, NABs are not 
 
 109. See BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 11, at 205–06. 
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immune to the milieu of the neighborhoods in which they reside and 
will reflect this same organizational capacity. Despite this, NABs can 
hopefully provide an opportunity to engage residents in the justice 
decisionmaking of which they are typically simply passive recipients. 
One of the most important principles of restorative justice is to 
redefine the roles and relationships between communities and their 
governments—that is, to shift the role of government from that of 
authoritative decisionmakers to facilitative problem solvers.
112
 In a 
restorative structure, government no longer ―tells‖ communities what 
they need and what will be provided for them, but rather responds to 
the requests of communities who have defined their own needs and 
then requested the support of government professionals to accomplish 
those objectives. Communities then marshal their own resources, 
particularly those not available to or through government pathways, 
to accomplish goals that meet both government and community 
needs. NABs provide a convenient and viable mechanism for 
fulfilling this principle. 
The presence of a NAB demonstrates community commitment 
and organization in support of the criminal justice system.
113
 Through 
NAB participation, community members ultimately may learn new 
skills and enjoy increased confidence in their capacity to solve local 
problems, and not simply just those limited to criminal and juvenile 
justice issues.
114
 Thus, NABs may have an important role to play in 
building community collective efficacy and in shifting the 
relationship between government professionals and community 
members. Moreover, NAB members may develop relationships with 
local employers as a way of helping offenders reintegrate and prevent 
future offenses,
115
 thus enhancing community capacity for civic 
engagement and youth development.
116
  
 
Community, 4 PUB. ORG. REV. 205, 213 (2004). 
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Collective efficacy may also include developing and maintaining 
civic engagement projects for NAB-served youth. Bazemore 
contends that if community service sentences are completed in a 
neighborhood setting where both victim and offender reside, 
meaningful sanctions can not only contribute to neighborhood well-
being, but also engage youthful offenders who are monitored by 
involved neighbors.
117
 For example, in Deschutes County, Oregon, 
youthful offenders sentenced to community service built houses in 
partnership with Habitat for Humanity.
118
 As a result, those offenders 
made lasting, positive contributions to improving the lives of fellow 
community members while simultaneously erecting permanent 
monuments that will serve as visible reminders of both community 
reparation and the benefits of sweat equity. These sorts of community 
service projects, when designed and carried out by NABs, can 
promote collective efficacy not only by increasing both adult 
problem-solving and normative standard setting, but also by 
encouraging youth development and productive civic engagement. 
Modernity, Weak and Strong Ties, and Restorative Process:  
When ―Less is More‖  
The presumptive answer to the important ―why-it-works‖ question 
in much of the restorative justice literature is ―the reintegrative 
shaming process‖ and an increase in offender empathy and remorse. 
While important, these explanations that are grounded in the 
emotional affective impact of strong family interaction and influence 
may bypass or de-emphasize the role of more instrumental 
connections that could otherwise create new opportunities for 
reintegration and healing for both victims and offenders.  
On the other hand, some theorists and researchers speculate that 
restorative justice processes achieve their sustained effects on 
reoffending due in part to their ability to facilitate prosocial 
connections and create relationships of ―social support.‖ These, in 
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turn, make important differences for offenders throughout their 
life.
119
 Some of these relationships are indeed based on strong 
emotional ties, but empirical studies find that resilient young people 
who, despite exposure to high risk environments, stay clear of 
involvement in crime or other deviant behavior (e.g., drug abuse) 
may have done so through instrumental, rather than affective, 
relationships.
120
 
In the view of some restorative advocates, NABs may seem 
inferior because they appear not to evoke the strong expressions of 
emotion commonly experienced with other restorative models. 
However, the social support component of NABs may be different in 
its relative reliance on what sociologists have referred to as the weak 
ties
121
 established by community volunteers with victims, offenders, 
and their respective supporters. ―Strong ties,‖ on the other hand, are 
those associated with extended families and traditional communities 
that rely heavily on emotive social control and support. For example, 
early immigrants to the United States naturally found support and 
comfort in extended families bound together by strong familial and 
cultural ties.
122
  
―Weak ties,‖ however, such as those potentially produced by 
NABs, are primarily those needed to find a job, gain access to higher 
education, get support from a mentor, and achieve other necessary 
goals. For the most part, restorative conferencing approaches such as 
family group conferencing and victim-offender mediation in 
particular, essentially rely on the impact and input of immediate and 
possibly extended family in their attempt to engage the strong ties of 
the family group. Conferences for young and adult offenders that 
include parents, grandparents, aunts, or other relatives tend to draw 
upon the strong ties designed to evoke emotional reactions from 
offenders and victims who realize that they are both supported (and, 
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in the case of offending youth, held accountable) by family and 
extended family.
123
  
We suggest that NAB practitioners have a choice that varies at the 
extremes from a practice that essentially operates as a weak ―court‖ 
with little stakeholder input or authority and where citizens act as 
―juries‖ in very minor cases, to a viable community-based program 
capable of bringing citizens together for prevention and intervention 
at the neighborhood level. NAB practice may be (appropriately) less 
intensive in response to some minor crimes and harms. Yet, it is 
possible that NABs appeal to different theories of change, and 
specifically to the instrumental, rather than affective, emotional ties 
that can result in basic, utilitarian skills and community engagement. 
Indeed, both kinds of ties are important for different reasons, and 
each can be linked directly to distinctive theories of change. 
In contrast to the strong ties of Durkheim’s gemeinschaft 
societies, which rarely reached beyond extended family,
124
 weak ties 
such as those that engage the input and assistance of neighbors, or 
even strangers, may mobilize both support for victim and offender as 
well as disapproval of behavior that harms individuals and 
communities. While restorative conferences may feature some 
mixture of both strong and weak tie focus, the more frequently 
discussed family group conferencing model appears to build on the 
―strong ties‖ of the traditional extended family. NABs, on the other 
hand, may meet different needs and even address different harms 
than other restorative practices; intentionally capitalizing on the 
―weaker‖ instrumental ties that bond larger groups of community 
members together without the strong emotional or ―affective‖ 
component of families.  
Moreover, as NAB members may include neighbors and possibly 
family members, an offender’s propensity to commit new crimes 
against their immediate and intimate community of care may 
 
 123. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Reason for Emotion: Reinventing Justice with Theories, 
Innovations and Research—The American Society of Criminology 2002 Presidential Address, 
41 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 15 (2003). 
 124. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL EDUCATION: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND 
APPLICATION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION (Everett K. Wilson ed., Everett K. Wilson & 
Herman Schnurer trans., 1961) (1925). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:17 
 
 
substantially decrease.
125
 Bazemore and Schiff’s qualitative research 
suggested increased connections between adults and youth 
participating in NABs because, as some adult NAB volunteers 
reported:  
 ―We aren’t getting paid to do this.‖  
 ―We can exercise the authority that parents have lost.‖  
 ―We live in their community.‖  
 ―We give them input into the contract.‖  
 ―We catch them off guard.‖ 
 ―We have been there, we can relate.‖ 
 ―They hear about the harm from real human beings—us and 
the victims.‖ 
 ―We follow-up.‖126 
Finally, members may also take on a variety of tasks that expand 
their social justice roles
127
 in developing the community’s capacity to 
both prevent and intervene in events of crime and disorder.
128
 Such 
ties more commonly strengthen instrumental, rather than simply 
emotional, connections with neighbors, teachers, employers, and 
community leaders, as well as families. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have considered a restorative justice process 
model—neighborhood accountability boards—that has become quite 
popular while also occasionally finding itself maligned by advocates 
of other restorative models. Three of the four major restorative 
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process models, including NABS, have been shown in numerous 
impact evaluations to be effective in delivering crime victim 
satisfaction, reducing recidivism, and other desirable outcomes.
129
  
While all models have strengths and weaknesses, NABs 
potentially offer a neighborhood-based approach that can incorporate 
restorative processes as well as enhance social capital for the purpose 
of building collective efficacy. In practice, NAB models may appear 
similar to other models and may even choose to incorporate elements 
of other conferencing dialogue processes such as peacemaking circles 
or family group conferencing in specific situations. We argue here 
that NABs’ theoretical strength is in their appeal to the value of weak 
ties that may provide essential instrumental support and guidance to 
offenders and victims. Their practical strength is their capacity to 
build collective efficacy at the neighborhood level through 
encouraging and engaging community members to become involved 
in local youth and justice issues.
130
 
Restorative programs in general provide important opportunities 
for neighborhoods and their occupants to come together to improve 
safety and support for their families. Parochial controls (such as 
those imposed by neighborhoods, schools, and faith-based 
institutions) that are enhanced by private controls (such as those 
offered through strong family ties) may ultimately minimize the need 
for strong public controls by police or the courts.
131
 Restorative 
processes and outcomes that build individual and collective skills 
may contribute to the ―bonding social capital‖ needed to enable the 
collective to affirm and enforce its norms and values. This may then 
transform into ―bridging social capital‖132 that can be used to leverage 
government resources to support community members, as well as 
provide a link between families, their neighborhood institutions, and 
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public controls and supports.
133
 This may, as in the current example, 
at least indirectly address social justice issues that can ultimately 
improve the conditions and efficacy of localized neighborhood 
institutions.
134
 Ideally, when well-envisioned, managed, and 
maintained, NABs may offer the possibility of an efficacious, 
community-building, decisionmaking model that capitalizes on 
strengths not found either in other restorative models or in any 
available justice strategy. 
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